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Abstract
In digital advertising, a publisher selling impressions faces a trade-off in deciding how
precisely to match advertisers with viewers. A more precise match generates effi ciency gains
that the publisher can hope to exploit. A coarser match will generate a thicker market and
thus more competition. The publisher can control the precision of the match by controlling the
amount of information that advertisers have about viewers. We characterize the optimal trade-
offwhen impressions are sold by auction. The publisher pools premium matches for advertisers
(when there will be less competition on average) but gives advertisers full information about
lower quality matches.
Jel Classification: D44, D47, D83, D84.
Keywords: Second Price Auction, Conflation, Targeted Advertising, Impressions, Two-Sided
Private Information, Bayesian Persuasion, Information Design.
∗We acknowledge financial support from NSF grants SES-2001208, SES-1948336 and SES-2049744, and ANID
Fondecyt Iniciacion 11200365. We thank Steve Berry, Ozan Candogan, Roberto Corrao, Phil Haile, Sergiu Hart, Jason
Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Maxim Ivanov, Anton Kolotilin, Renato Paes Leme, Denis Shishkin, Rann Smorodinsky,
Philipp Strack, Alex Wolitzky and Song Zuo for informative discussions. We thank seminar audiences at Informs
AMD, UCSD, PUC Chile, the Hebrew University Center for the Study of Rationality, the China Meetings of the
Econometric Society and the Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory for many helpful comments.
This manuscript combines and subsumes the results in Bergemann, Heumann and Morris (2021) and Sorokin and
Winter (2021). These two papers shared the current Theorem 1, obtained via different proof strategies.
†Yale University, dirk.bergemann@yale.edu.
‡Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, tibor.heumann@uc.cl.
§Massachusetts Institute of Technology, semorris@mit.edu
¶Glasgow University and Higher School of Economics, constantine.sorokin@glasgow.ac.uk
‖The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and Lancaster University, eyal.winter@mail.huji.ac.il
1
1 Introduction
In the internet advertising market, it has become technologically feasible to match advertisers to
viewers with ever-greater precision. But do publishers selling impressions have an incentive to
do so? Finer matching generates effi ciency gains that sellers can hope to exploit. But coarser
matching generates market thickness, and so more market competition and less information rent for
advertisers. Impressions are typically sold by auction and publishers can control the precision of
the match by controlling the information that bidders have access to. We characterize the trade-off
between effi ciency and competition for the publisher.
We do this in two steps. First, we characterize what information a seller would choose to give
bidders about their values in a classic auction in a standard independent private values setting.
Second, we provide a model of the market for impressions in digital advertising markets, and show
how our characterization applies in this setting. We now discuss these two steps in turn.
Consider a second price auction where bidders’valuations are independently and symmetrically
distributed, but initially unknown to the bidders. The seller can choose what information each
bidder can learn about their own value. If the seller did not allow them to learn anything, then
all bidders would bid their (common) expected value and the good would be randomly (and inef-
ficiently) allocated among them. If the seller allowed bidders to learn their true value, then they
would have a dominant strategy (under private values in a second price auction) to bid their values.
The good would be allocated effi ciently to the bidder with the highest value. The revenue of the
seller would equal the value of the effi cient allocation minus the bidders’ information rent. By
permitting bidders to learn something but not everything about their values, the seller can trade
off effi ciency loss with information rent reduction. Our main result is a characterization of the
optimal (among symmetric) information policies for the seller.
Conditional on having a low value, a bidder is likely to be competing with other bidders and earn
low information rents. But conditional on having a high value, a bidder is likely to win (facing weak
competition) and thus can expect to win at a price significantly below his value, thus earning high
information rents. Thus the gains from concealing information will be highest when valuations are
high. In the optimal policy, high values are pooled and low values are revealed. There is a critical
threshold described by a quantile above which all valuations are bundled together (Theorem 1). The
threshold is given by a quantile of the distribution that depends only on the number of bidders and
not the distribution of valuations. The optimal quantile until which disclosure occurs is increasing
in the number of participating bidders and goes towards 1 (i.e., full disclosure) as the number of
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bidders grows arbitrarily large. Thus, the information policy is influencing the distribution of bids,
holding fixed the distribution of preferences among the bidders.
The optimal threshold is designed to keep a moderate level of competition at the top of the bid
distribution. If the threshold is too low, more bidder surplus will be extracted but the expected value
conditional on being above the threshold will be too low. If the threshold is too high, the expected
value conditional on being above the threshold will be high but too little bidder surplus will be
extracted. The optimal quantile keeps “around”two bidders at the top of the bid distribution —i.e.,
with the same expected value and competing with each other. This gives just enough competition to
extract the bidder surplus at low effi ciency cost. The gains from the optimal information structure
will depend on the distribution of values, ranging from no gains to a revenue that can be arbitrarily
larger than the expected revenue generated under complete information. As the number of bidders
grows large, the gains will remain substantive as long as the distribution of values has fat tails.
Our paper’s motivation is the market for impressions in digital advertising. A large share
of digital advertising, whether in search, display advertising or social networks, is allocated by
auction mechanisms. The second price auction is commonly used in digital advertising to form
a match between competing advertisers (the bidders) and a viewer. A match between viewer
and advertiser creates an impression (or search result) on the publisher’s website. The seller (a
publisher or intermediary) uses an auction platform to sell the attention (“eyeball”) of the viewer
to competing advertisers. The viewer is thus the object of the auction. The viewers are typically
heterogeneous in many attributes: their demographic characteristics, their preferences, their (past)
shopping behavior, their browsing history and other aspects, observable and unobservable. The
advertisers therefore display a corresponding degree of heterogeneity in their willingness to pay for
a match between their advertisement and a specific viewer. The private (and the social) value
of any particular match is then determined jointly by the viewer’s attributes and the advertiser’s
preferences for those attributes. In the presence of this heterogeneity on both sides of the match,
viewer and advertiser, internet advertising has moved towards targeted advertising to join the
information. The auction can therefore support highly targeted advertising that may increase the
social effi ciency in the match formation between viewer and advertiser. But - as discussed earlier
- allowing for finely targeted bidding may also thin the market among the advertisers, and hence
reduce the competition between advertisers. Publishers distinguish two schemes, or algorithms, for
mapping preferences and attributes into bids, automated bidding andmanual bidding. In automated
bidding, autobidding for short, the seller offers a bidding algorithm that generates optimal bids for
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the advertisers given the disclosed information.1 In manual bidding, the seller offers a disclosure
algorithm that generates information about the attributes, and in particular a bid recommendation,
which each bidder then manually adopts or modifies into a bid for the impression, also referred to
as dashboard mechanism in Hartline, Johnsen, Nekipelov, and Zoeter (2019). Autobidding has
become increasingly prevalent in digital advertising to convert the high-dimensional information
across millions of impressions into bids with minimal latency, see Aggarwal, Badanidiyuru, and
Mehta (2019) and Deng, Mao, Mirrokni, and Zuo (2021).
In this market, publishers can control the information that advertisers have about their val-
ues. While there are many reasons why advertisers’values might be correlated, they will not be
if variation in viewers’attributes is horizontal. We develop a stylized model of the market for im-
pressions, establish that our earlier model applies to this market, and show how the results apply
under reasonable assumptions on the market.
In our model of this market, a viewer is characterized by a (perhaps high-dimensional) attribute.
The publisher (but not the advertisers) knows the attribute of the viewer. The advertiser (but
not the publisher) knows the characteristics of the good being advertised and hence has preference
over viewer attributes. The viewer attribute can be combined with an advertiser’s preference to
generate a match quality, and the value of the viewer to the advertiser is an increasing function
of the match quality. A key feature of this model is that the advertiser’s private information
is not informative about his value of a viewer unless it is combined with information held by the
publisher. The publisher sells impressions (the allocation of the viewer to an advertiser) in a second
price auction. Because only the publisher knows the attributes of the viewer, the publisher can
control the information that advertisers have about their match quality with the viewer.
We present two results in our model. We first show that this model of two-sided information gives
rise to the setting of our main result: an independent private values setting, where the advertiser
has no information about his value of the viewer, but the combination of the publisher’s information
about attributes and advertiser’s information about preferences fully reveals the state. Now we
can identify the optimal information structure from our earlier analysis. But how can this be
implemented in practise? We consider autobidding. The advertiser reports his preferences to the
publisher and the publisher commits to bid optimally for the bidder as a function of the optimal
information structure. We show that the bidder will have an incentive to truthfully report his
1See Google Ads Help Center (2021a), (2021b), or Facebook Business Help Center (2021) for summary descriptions
of automated bidding mechanisms.
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preferences. Thus autobidding implements the optimal outcome in this market.
Literature Levin and Milgrom (2010) suggested that the idea of conflation (central in many
commodity markets) by which similar but distinct products are treated as identical in order to
make markets thicker or reduce cherry-picking, may be relevant for the design on online advertising
markets. The optimal information structure we derive in Theorem 1 exactly determines when con-
flation should occur, in the upper interval, and when not, in the lower interval. Ghosh, Nazerzadeh,
and Sundararajan (2007) and Emek, Feldman, Gamzu, Leme, and Tennenholtz (2012) investigate
the computational complexity of the determining the optimal information structure when there are
many preference profiles and many attribute profiles that might be sold in an auction.
The paper relates to the literature studying optimal information disclosure in selling mecha-
nisms. Ganuza (2004) studies the optimal information disclosure in a second-price auction, where
bidder’s valuation are determined by the quality of a match between a bidder’s taste and the good’s
characteristic represented by Hotelling model on a circle. The seller chooses the optimal public
signal about the good’s characteristic. He shows that the equilibrium information provision is less
than the surplus-maximizing one. His result is about costly public signals and so it does not address
the trade-off between effi ciency and market thickness that is central in our paper.
Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) analyze the joint optimal design of auction and information
structure. In particular, they allow for asymmetric information structures and personalized reserve
prices. Here, we fix the selling mechanism to be a second-price auction as it is a better fit for the
markets for selling impressions.
2 Model
There are N bidders who compete for an indivisible good in an auction. Bidder i’s valuation is
denoted by vi ∈ R+. We assume that the valuations are independently and identically distributed
across bidders according to an absolutely continuous distribution, denoted by F . The assumptions
that F is absolutely continuous helps simplify some of the expressions but all results go through
unchanged if we relax this assumption.
The seller can choose how much information each bidder will have about his own valuation. An
information structure is denoted by:
si : R+ → ∆R+,
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where si(vi) is the signal observed by bidder i when his valuation is vi. After observing si, the
bidder forms his beliefs about his valuation. An agent’s expected valuation is denoted by:
wi , E[vi | si].
We denote by Gi the distribution of expected valuations. Note that we are making two assumptions
about the information structure. First, each bidder only observes information about his own val-
uation, which is reflected by the fact that si takes as an argument vi only (instead of (v1, ..., vN)).
Second, there is no common source of randomization in the signals. Hence, the signals will be in-
dependently distributed across bidders. Finally, we additionally assume that the seller is restricted
to symmetric information structures, i.e., si(·) = sj(·).
The objective of the seller is to maximize revenue. Since bidders are competing in a second-price
auction it is a dominant strategy to bid their expected valuation. Hence, revenue is equal to the
second-highest expected valuation across bidders. We denote the k-th highest valuation by w(k).




3 Optimal Information Structure
Since the expected revenue is equal to the expectation of second-highest valuation, the distribution
of expected valuations generated by the signal is a suffi cient statistic to compute the seller’s expected
revenue. Hence, instead of studying explicitly the information structure chosen by the seller, we
frequently refer to the distribution of expected valuations generated by the signals, which we denoted
by G.
The second-order statistic of N symmetrically and independently distributed random variables
is distributed according to
Pr(w(2) ≤ t) = NGN−1(t)(1−G(t)) +GN(t).





We now characterize the set of feasible distributions G.
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By Blackwell (1951), Theorem 5, there exists a signal s that induces a distribution of expected
valuations if and only if F is a mean preserving spread of G. F is defined to be a mean preserving





G(t)dt, ∀v ∈ R+,
with equality for v = 0. If F is a mean preserving spread of G we write F ≺ G.
We can now express the seller’s problem as maximizing revenue by choosing a distribution G
subject to a mean-preserving constraint. The choice of the optimal information structure can be






subject to F ≺ G.
This problem consists of maximizing over feasible distributions of expected valuations. However,
the objective function is non-linear in the probability (or density) of the optimization variable G.
Moreover, the non-linearity cannot be confined to be either concave or convex on G.
The key step in our argument comes from a change of variables, re-writing the above in terms
of the quantile q of the second order statistic. We denote by SN(q) the cumulative distribution
function of the quantile of the second-highest valuation:
SN(q) , Pr(G(w(2)) ≤ q).
We index by N to highlight the dependence on the number of bidders. We observe that SN(q) is
given by:
SN(q) = Nq
N−1(1− q) + qN .
The quantile distribution SN is independent of the underlying distribution F . Just as the quantile
of any random variable is uniformly distributed, the quantile of the second-order statistic of N
symmetric independent random variables is distributed according to SN for any underlying distrib-
ution. Hence, the revenue can be computed by taking the expectation over quantiles using measure
SN(q): the revenue given the quantile of the second-order statistic is G−1. Thus the maximization







subject to G−1 ≺ F−1.
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The corresponding constraint states that the seller can choose any distribution of expected valua-
tions whose quantile function G−1 is a mean-preserving spread of the quantile function F−1 of the
initial distribution of valuations. This uses a well-known property of the distribution function, see
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), Chapter 3, stating that F ≺ G if and only if G−1 ≺ F−1. Hence,
we have a linear (in G−1) maximization problem subject to a majorization constraint, which will
allow us to solve the problem with known methods.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Information Structure)
1. The unique optimal symmetric information structure is given by:
s(vi) =
vj, if F (vi) < q∗N ;E[vj | F (vj) ≥ q], if F (vi) ≥ q∗N . (4)
where the critical quantile q∗N ∈ [0, 1) is independent of F .
2. The critical quantile satisfies q∗2 = 0; q
∗
N is increasing in N ; q
∗
N → 1 as N →∞; and for each
N ≥ 3, q∗N is the unique solution in (0, 1) to the following polynomial equation of degree N :
S ′N(q)(1− q) = 1− SN(q). (5)
Thus, the optimal information structure is to reveal the valuation of all those bidders who have
a valuation lower than some threshold determined by a fixed quantile q∗N and otherwise reveal no
information beyond the fact that the valuation is above the threshold. The threshold in terms
of the valuation is given by F−1(q∗N), but the quantile q
∗
N is independent of the distribution F of
valuations.
The optimal information structures thus supports more competition at the top of the distribution
at the expense of an effi cient allocation. The information structure fails to distinguish in the
allocation between any two valuations that are in the upper tail of the distribution [F−1(q∗N),∞).
The benefit accrues through more competitive bids among the high value bidders. Namely, if the
second highest bid is in the above upper interval, then its competitive bid matches exactly the bid
of the winning bid, and thus the information rent of the winning bidder is depressed considerably
with a corresponding gain in the revenue for the seller.
Before we prove the result, we will provide some intuition for the critical quantile by confirming
that it must be given by equation (5) as long as information takes the qualitative form given by
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Theorem 1. Suppose that we fix a quantile threshold q and write v = F−1 (q) for the corresponding
value. Now what happens to revenue if we decrease the threshold by dq?
With probability S ′N (q) dq the second-highest bid was not in the pooling zone before the decrease
and is after the decrease; and revenue increases by (E [vi | vi ≥ v]−v). With probability 1−SN (q),
the second-highest bid was in the pooling zone before the decrease and there is a loss of revenue of




1− q (E [vi | vi ≥ v]− v).
Hence, the revenue gain is proportional to S ′N(q) and the revenue loss is proportional to (1 −
SN(q))/(1 − q). Equating gains and losses we get (5), as the term (E [vi | vi ≥ v] − v)dq appears
on both sides and hence cancels out. Furthermore, among the class of upper-pooling information
structure, revenue is quasi-concave and single-peaked in the threshold q (see Sorokin and Winter
(2021)).
To prove Theorem 1, we state a result of Kleiner, Moldovanu, and Strack (2021) in terms of our
maximization problem (3).2
Proposition 1 (Kleiner, Moldovanu, and Strack (2021), Proposition 2)
Let G−1 be such that for some countable collection of intervals {[xi, x̄i) | i ∈ I},
G−1(q) =
F−1(q), if q 6∈ ∪i∈I [xi, x̄i);∫ x̄x F−1(t)dt
x̄i−xi
, if q ∈ [xi, x̄i).
If convSN is affi ne on [xi, xi) for each i ∈ I and if convSN = SN otherwise, then G−1 solves problem
(3). Moreover, if F−1 is strictly increasing the converse holds.
Here, convSN is the convexification of SN , i.e., the largest convex function that is smaller than
SN . With this result we can prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 1. The second derivative of the distribution SN of the quantile of the
second order statistic is given by:
S ′′N(q) = q
N−3(N − 1)N(N − 2− q(N − 1)).
Hence, SN(q) is concave if and only if
q ≥ (N − 2)/(N − 1),
2The proof of Theorem 1 in Sorokin and Winter (2021) was self-contained and did not refer to the verification
result of Kleiner, Moldovanu, and Strack (2021).
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and convex otherwise. Thus, the convex hull of SN for N ≥ 3 is:
convSN (q) =
SN(q), if q ≤ q∗N ;S ′N(q∗N)(q − q∗N) + S(q∗N), otherwise.
where q∗N is defined as in (5) for N ≥ 3. For N = 2, we have convS2 (q) = q and define q∗2 = 0.
Now let G−1 be given by:
G−1(q) =






, q ∈ [q∗N , 1);
1, q = 1.
(6)
Then, G−1 satisfies all the assumptions of Proposition 1, so it is the unique optimal solution to (3).
For all valuations below F−1(q∗N) the distribution over expected valuations is the same as that of
the real valuations. Hence, types below F−1(q∗N) know their own values. On the other hand, for
valuations above F−1(q∗N) the distribution over expected valuations is a mass point at the expected
valuation conditional on being above F−1(q∗N). Hence it is clear that this distribution is induced by
information structure (4).
To check that q∗N is strictly increasing in N we define:
ψ(q,N) , S ′N(q)(1− q)− (1− SN(q)).
By definition, ψ(q∗N , N) = 0. We now note that:
ψ(q,N + 1)− ψ(q,N) = N(q − 1)2(N(q − 1) + 1)qN−2.
so ψ(q,N+1)−ψ(q,N) ≥ 0 if and only if q ≥ (N−1)/N . As previously argued, q∗N < (N−2)/(N−1)
so q∗N < (N − 1)/N , which implies that:
ψ(q∗N , N + 1) < 0. (7)
We also have that ψ(0, N) = −1 and ψ(1 − ε,N) > 0 for ε small enough, where the last part can







= N(N − 1) > 0.











N)→ 0. So (5) would not be satisfied. We thus must have that limN→∞ q∗N = 1.
It is useful to compare our problem to a Bayesian persuasion model where the objective function






subject to F ≺ G,
as, for example in Dworczak and Martini (2019). Our original maximization problem (2) did not
take this form as it was non-linear in probabilities. However, we reformulated the problem to one
that is linear in the new optimization variable G−1, changing the direction of the constraint.3 For
this problem, the convexification of SN was key to identifying the optimal information structure.
The information structure (4) that emerges here is sometimes referred to as "upper censorship" in
the Bayesian persuasion literature, as it pools all the states above a threshold and reveals all the
states below the threshold (Alonso and Camara (2016); Kolotilin, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk
(2021)).
Competition at the Top We can gain further intuition about the optimal policy, by examining
the degree of competition at the top of the bid distribution. We will show that the expected number
of bidders above the threshold lies in a narrow range around 2.
The number of bidders that have the highest expected valuation follows a binomial distribution,
denoted conventionally by B(N, 1 − q∗N). The expected number of bidders at the top of the bid
distribution is then given by:4
ρ∗N , N(1− q∗N).
Now ρ∗2 = 2, since q
∗
2 = 0. To characterize ρ
∗
N for N ≥ 3, we can substitute q∗N = 1 − ρ∗N/N into


















3Relatedly, Proposition 12 in Kolotilin and Wolitzky (2020) solves a problem in gerrymandering that is isomorphic
to a Bayesian persuasion problem that is non-linear in the probabilities. A linearization of the problem is implicit
in their proof.
4This is the expression for the mean of any binomial distribution (see, for example, Papoulis and Pillai (2002)).
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One can numerically verify that ρ∗N is decreasing in N ≥ 3, with ρ∗3 = 2.25 and ρ∗N ↓ ρ∗∞ ≈ 1.793 as
N →∞. The limit value ρ∗∞ can be solved analytically, as equation (8) reduces to
(ρ∗∞)
2 + ρ∗∞ + 1 = e
ρ∗∞ ,
as N → ∞, whose solution is ρ∗∞ ≈ 1.793. Furthermore, as N → ∞, the binomial distribution
B(N, 1−q∗N) converges to a Poisson distribution with parameter ρ∗∞, by the Poisson Limit Theorem
(see Papoulis and Pillai (2002)).
Hence, the optimal information policy always keeps “about” 2 bidders above the threshold,
which is the key to extracting bidder surplus.
Gains from the Optimal Information Policy We next consider the revenue gain from the
optimal information policy. So let us define the revenue gain to be the ratio of revenue under the
optimal policy to revenue under complete information. We will report three examples illustrating
the magnitude and variation in revenue gains.
First, consider the case where the distribution of values has a binary support.5 This example will
illustrate the wide variation in revenue gain that can arise. In particular, suppose the distribution
of values has support {0, 1/(2(1− p))}, with Pr(vi = 0) = p. So the mean value is 1/2 for every p.
When q∗N < p, the optimal information structure is the same as complete information, so there
is no benefit from hiding information from the bidders. When q∗N > p, the optimal information
structure generates expected valuations with support in {0, 1/(2(1− q∗N))}, with Pr(wi = 0) = q∗N .
In the limit p → 1, complete information generates zero revenue while the optimal information
generates positive revenue, so the optimal information structure generates infinitely times more
revenue than complete information. This is because the probability of two bidders having high
valuation in the limit p → 1 converges to zero, while the optimal information structure keeps a
moderate level competition at the top of the bid distribution. Intuitively, when the distribution is
heavily skewed, the benefits from manipulating bidders’information is larger.
Second, consider the case where values are uniformly distribution on [0, 1]. This example is a
leading benchmark in analysis of auctions. Sorokin and Winter (2021) report detailed numerical
analysis of this case as N varies. For example, if N = 3 and F is uniform on [0, 1], the revenue
gain is approximately 1.1. Given the bounded support of values, it is necessarily the case that as
5We stated our main result for continuous distributions of values, but the form of the optimal information structure
remains the same (with only minor modifications to describe the optimal information strcture as given by (4).)
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N →∞, the revenue gain goes to zero simply because the complete-information revenue converges
to the highest value in the support.
Third, consider the case where the distribution of values has fat upper tails. Arnosti, Beck, and
Milgrom (2016) argue that this provides a good fit for demand in digital advertising markets. This
example will illustrate that it is possible to have large revenue gains even as the number of bidders
becomes large. This case is analyzed in detail in Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris (2021). It is
shown that as the number of bidders grows, the revenue gain converges to a constant that depends
on the fatness of the tail. In the case of a Pareto tail with distribution F (v) = 1−v−α, the limiting
revenue gain (as N →∞) is above 1 for α > 1 and converges to ∞ as α ↓ 1. The intuition is that
despite there being many bidders, there is a high probability of the highest valuation significantly
exceeding other valuations. Formally, when the distribution has fat tails:
E[v(1)]− E[v(2)]→∞, as N →∞,
so under complete information bidder surplus is not competed away as the number of bidders grows.
By contrast, the optimal information structure generates more competition in the tail of the bid
distribution and thus reduces bidder surplus substantially.
4 Market for Impressions
We now translate the earlier results into a market for impressions with two-sided information. This
translation recasts the optimal information design as bidding mechanisms in the world of digital
advertising. The choice of the optimal information structure can then interpreted in terms of the
information policy of the publisher who matches the viewer with the advertisers.
The viewer has attribute x ∈ X distributed according to Fx. Each advertiser i is represented
by a vector yi ∈ Y , distributed according to Fy, identically and independently distributed across
advertisers. An impression is a match between an advertiser and a viewer. The value vi of advertiser
i from attracting a viewer is determined by a function u:
u : X × Y → R+,
such that:
vi , u(x, y),
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and we refer to u as the valuation function. Since advertiser i’s value for every viewer is determined
by yi, we refer to the vector yi as the advertiser’s preferences (with a slight abuse of terminol-
ogy). The distribution of attributes and preferences (x, y) and the valuation function u induce a
distribution of the bidder i’s value vi, denoted by F .
We assume that the unconditional distribution of values (v1, ..., vN) generated by (x, y) are
independent across bidders. We further assume that the unconditional distribution of values are
the same as the conditional distribution of values (v1, ..., vN) conditional on either x or y. That is,
(x, v1, ..., vN) and (y, v1, ..., vN) are random vectors consisting of independently distributed random
variables. Of course, (x, yi, vi) are not independently distributed. In other words, the preferences yi
provide only information about the value vi when combined with information about the attributes
x of the viewer. Moreover, each advertiser i’s belief about the valuation of their competitors is
unaffected by the attributes x or the preferences yi. Thus, the present model of attributes and
preferences generates a model of independent private values.
These assumptions implicitly impose restrictions on the set of valuation functions and distribu-
tions of attributes and preferences that we consider. In other words, not every valuation function
u and distributions Fx, Fy will generate joint distributions of values that satisfy these assump-
tions. The attributes of viewer therefore reflect an aspect of horizontal differentiation with value
implications that depend on the preferences of the advertiser. Conversely, an aspect of vertical dif-
ferentiation that has similar implications across all preferences would fail the equivalence between
unconditional and conditional value distribution. We now briefly describe two classes of models
that satisfy the above conditions, one high-dimensional and one low-dimensional set of models.
Our leading example is given by the following specification. The set of possible attributes and
preferences are given by X = Y = {−1, 1}J . Each component of the attributes and preferences is
distributed uniformly and independently across components. The valuation function is given by:









for some strictly increasing function u. Hence, an advertiser’s valuation is increasing in the number
of components in which the attributes and preferences are aligned.
A second class of models is given by the following Hotelling location model that has only a
one-dimensional space of uncertainty. Suppose that X = Y = [0, 1], where x, yi are positions in a
circle of perimeter 1 uniformly and independently distributed. Let d(x, yi) be the shortest distance
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between x and yi on the circle and
u(x, yi) = u(d (x, yi)), (10)
for some strictly decreasing function u.
Both of these classes of models satisfy the independence conditions above. Of course, indepen-
dence is (as always) a knife-edge assumption, so we require strong assumptions on the distributions
of preferences and attributes to generate independent values. However, these assumptions have a
clear economic interpretation, namely, we are modeling a two-sided market with (and only with)
horizontal differentiation.
We now analyze automated bidding in the second-price auction based on a signal of the value
of the impression.6 Thus, the publisher commits: (i) to complement the advertiser’s information
with a signal regarding the match quality; and (ii) to set the advertiser-optimal bid. In turn, the
advertiser submits his preferences y (and thus a description of the attributes he cares about). The
central aspect of automated bidding is that the publisher complements the advertiser’s private
information y with information about the viewer’s attribute x that is unknown to the advertiser.
Formally, the publisher chooses a signal si : R→ ∆R as a function of the advertiser’s reported
value vi (x, yi). While the publisher cannot directly observe vi, she elicits the advertiser’s preferences
and knows the viewer attributes, so she can infer vi. The publisher submits a bid bi : Y × R → R
satisfying that:
bi(yi, si) = E[vi | yi, si(vi)] (11)
That is, the publisher submits a bid on behalf of advertiser i equal to the advertiser’s expected
valuation given his preferences yi and the additional information si provided by the publisher. This
is an advertiser’s dominant strategy given the available information (yi, s(vi)). Because (vi, yi) are
independently distributed, we have that:
E[vi | yi, si(vi)] = E[vi | si(vi)].




which is the original problem stated earlier in (1).
6We discussed two alternative bidding procedures - automated bidding and manual bidding - in the Introduction,
and briefly return to discuss manual bidding in the final Section 5.
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We now verify that under the automated bidding in the second price auction, it is optimal for
each advertiser to truthfully report their preferences to the publisher. A reporting strategy for
bidder i is denoted by:
ỹi : Y → ∆Y.
Given the reported preferences, the seller discloses to the bidder a signal s(ṽi), where ṽi is the
valuation of an advertiser with preferences ỹi. The induced bid is denoted by b̃i, while bi denotes
the bid when preferences are reported truthfully.
Proposition 2 (Truthful Reporting in Automated Bidding)
Under the optimal information structure, it is a dominant strategy for an advertiser to report truth-
fully his preferences to the publisher.
Proof. By assumption, (vi, yi) are independently distributed. Thus, b̃i follows the same distri-
bution for every reported preference ỹi. Of course, the joint distribution of (vi, b̃i) does depend on
the reporting strategy.
We first define the bid associated with the upper interval:
b̄ , E[vi | vi ≥ F−1(q∗N)],
and note that under the optimal information structure:
Pr(vi ≤ v′, bi ≤ b′) =

F (v′), if b′ = b̄;
F (v′), if b′ < b̄ and v′ ≤ b′;
F (b′), if b′ < b̄ and v′ > b′.
(12)
This follows from the fact that bi ≤ b̄ with probability 1 and when bi < b̄ we have bi = vi.
We observe that for all v′, b′ ∈ R:
Pr(vi ≤ v′, b̃i ≤ b′) ≤ min{Pr(vi ≤ v′),Pr(b̃i ≤ b′)} = min{Pr(vi ≤ v′),Pr(bi ≤ b′)} = Pr(vi ≤ v′, bi ≤ b′),
The first inequality is true for any bivariate distribution, the first equality is because both distri-
butions have the same marginals, and the second equality follows from (12). By definition, this
means that (vi, bi) is greater than (vi, b̃i) in the positive quadrant dependent order (see Shaked and
Shanthikumar (2007)).
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We now write the difference in the expected bidder’s surplus under truthful reporting and
misreporting as follows:
∆V , E[(vi − bi) Pr(bi ≥ max
j 6=i
bj)]− E[(vi − b̃i) Pr(b̃i ≥ max
j 6=i
bj)]
= E[(vi Pr(bi ≥ max
j 6=i
bj)]− E[vi Pr(b̃i ≥ max
j 6=i
bj)],
where Pr(b ≥ maxj 6=i bj) is the probability that the N − 1 competing bids are less than b and we
use that the distribution of bi is the same as b̃i to cancel out two terms. Clearly Pr(b ≥ maxj 6=i bj)
is an increasing function of b, so v Pr(b ≥ maxj 6=i bj) is supermodular in (v, b), which implies that
E[vi Pr(b̃i ≥ max
j 6=i
bj)] ≤ E[vi Pr(bi ≥ max
j 6=i
bj)],
see (9.A.18.) in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
The proposition states that advertisers are willing to submit their preferences honestly to the
publisher. The intuition for the proof is that misreporting would not change the distribution of
bids, but instead, only decrease the correlation between an advertiser’s bid and his valuation.
The automated bidding algorithm can alternatively be interpreted as a restriction on the bidding
language imposed by a publisher. The publisher then runs a second price auction conditional on
the realized attributes and the bidding rules.
We can illustrate this in our leading example of binary characteristics described above in (9).
The optimal information structure can be implemented in a straightforward manner in the model of
characteristics. Namely, the seller informs each bidder about the number of matched characteristics
as long as this number is smaller than a threshold number n∗ implied by the optimal quantile q∗N .
If the number of matched characteristics exceeds n∗, then the seller only reports that the realized
matches exceed the threshold number n∗. Thus, a restriction in terms of the bidding language
would allow the bidder to place bids as a function of the matched characteristics up to n∗, but not
beyond that. This restriction in terms of the bidding language would then lead to the optimal bids
as described by (11).
By interpreting Theorem 1 through the model of binary characteristics (9) we get that the
optimal information structure supports a match process between advertiser and viewer that is often
referred to as "broad match" in digital advertising, see Dar, Mirrokni, Muthukrishnan, Mansour,
and Nadav (2009) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2016). By broad matching, the seller provides matches
not only on the exact and narrow matches for specific keywords and characteristics but also for a
larger, hence broad set of matches, see Google Ads Help Center (2021c). In our model, these are
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matches of quality at least n∗. Our paper’s main insight in this context is that "broad matching"
should be used only to pool high quality matches, while low quality matches should bid according
to their values.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We studied the revenue-maximizing information structure in a second-price auction without reserve
price and provided a model of two-sided private information that generated a model of independent
private values. We focused on the market of impression as our main application, but we believe that
our analysis is valuable to other markets where the seller’s information is superior or supplemental
in at least some dimensions to that of the bidders, e.g. markets of second hand goods and markets
for experience goods.
Auction Format In the current environment with independent private values, the revenue equiv-
alence result holds. Thus all classic auction formats, e.g., first-price auction, generate the same
expected revenue. Hence, while we formally study the second-price auction, the results extend to
all classic auction formats.
Reserve Price Our main analysis focuses on the second-price auction without reserve price.
However, the analysis of the optimal information structure can be extend to auctions with a reserve
price r with minor modifications (Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris (2021)). With a reserve price
r, the optimal information structure is as follows. At the top, there is a pooling region followed
by a region of full disclosure (bidders learn their valuation if it is in this region). However, the full
disclosure region is followed by a second pooling region that generates an expected valuation exactly
equal to the reserve price. The reason for the second pooling region is that the seller’s expected
revenue is discontinuous in the expected values around the threshold, so bidders who are marginally
below the reserve price r are made more optimistic so that they bid the reserve price.
Asymmetric Information Structures We focus on describing the optimal symmetric infor-
mation structure. While we do not have a general result showing that the optimal information
structure is always symmetric, we have some partial results that point to this direction (see Berge-
mann, Heumann, and Morris (2021)). The symmetric information structure that we derive is indeed
the unique optimal information structure when there are two or three bidders, thus N = 2 or N = 3.
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We can also show that, if the information structure is the optimal symmetric information for N − 1
bidders, then it is optimal for the remaining bidder to also observe the optimal symmetric informa-
tion. Hence, there is no improvement that involves changing the information structure of only one
bidder.
Bidder-Optimal Information Structure The bidder-optimal information structure can be
analyzed using the same tools we used in our paper. In this case, the optimal information structure
exhibits pooling at the bottom and complete information at the top of the bid distribution (see
Sorokin and Winter (2021)).
Manual Bidding and Obedience We discussed how the optimal information structure can be
implemented by automated bidding algorithms. These algorithms generate bids for the advertisers
as function of the preferences elicited from the advertisers and the attributes of the viewer. We
established in Proposition 2 that automated bidding supports truthful revelation of the private
information by the advertisers. A different class of algorithms is frequently described as manual
bidding algorithms. Here, the bidders are asked to reveal their preferences first, and then are invited
to bid on the basis of bid recommendations that take into account both the preferences and the at-
tribute information. These algorithms implicitly require both truthtelling and obedience constraints
to be satisfied. The additional restrictions imposed by the obedience constraints, namely that the
bidder wishes to follow the bid recommendation, may sometimes prevent the implementation of
the optimal information structure for a given number N of bidders. Yet, we can show that in the
presence of a large number of bidders we can approximate the revenue of the optimal information
structure with a two-sided pooling information structure that is only a small variation of the optimal
information structure presented here (see Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris (2021)).
Horizontal vs Vertical Differentiation An interpretation of the characteristics model is that
it generates horizontal differentiation among bidders. By contrast, other models of characteristics
would generate vertical differentiation and correlated values. For example, if each dimension
of attributes and tastes were represented by the positive orthant, then a higher realization of any
attribute would represent an element of vertical differentiation, and the ex-ante distribution of values
would be correlated across bidders, thus introducing an element of common values. If valuations
are correlated among bidders, then bidders would be subject to the winner’s curse. This would
introduce new trade-offs that relate the bidders’information to the winner’s curse. From a technical
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perspective, the second price auction would no longer have a dominant-strategy equilibrium, so the
characterization of the revenue in terms of the second-order statistic of expected valuations would no
longer hold. While extending the analysis formally is not trivial, the linkage principle suggests that
the seller would publicly disclose any information about common shocks affecting correlations, thus
making the valuations conditionally independent which would allow us to go back to our analysis,
using the results of Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017), (2019).
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